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Comments from the hearing in Livermore,
California.
September 14, 1999
Thank you for allowing me the opportunity to present my comments on DOE's Proposed Rule on Polygraph Examination Regulation. I have had a DOE Q Clearance and have worked in some aspect or other of the U.S. nuclear weapons program for 27 of the past 32 years, the last 16 years at the UC labs, first at Los Alamos and then here at LLNL. I am well aware of my responsibilities as a holder of a Q Clearance, and support any and all measures that serve to enhance and strengthen US nuclear weapons security. The use of polygraph examinations, however, will not help to strengthen nuclear weapons security, but will in fact have just the opposite effect, as I will now argue.
In the absence of nuclear testing, the credibility of the US nuclear deterrent rests entirely on the credibility of the science base on which it is built. The science cannot thrive and prosper in an environment of fear, distrust, and suspicion, which is precisely the atmosphere that is created by this proposed rule. One of my roles in my current position is to recruit new postdocs for our program. It is already difficult to find people with the requisite training in the high energy-density physics required for this work, and we have a hard time competing with major university labs for the few good people who have such training. If I have to tell prospective postdocs that they need to undergo polygraph testing to take a job in our lab then my already difficult recruiting job becomes impossible. Even for the scientists already here, the proposed rule is already having a chilling effect. The number of papers being presented by LLNL scientists at this Novemberís annual American Physical Society meeting is down by 33% from last year. Although there may be several factors responsible for this big decrease, surely one of them is that many people have been "scared off" by the current swirling controversy over security lapses at the labs, and have chosen to keep a very low profile. There are several other measures of decreased scientific productivity that perhaps other speakers will have time to address. If this productivity decline becomes a long-term trend, as is likely, in my view, if this rule is implemented, then the science enterprise at the labs will surely be damaged, and the US will become, after 10 or 20 years, only a second-rate nuclear power. It is hard for me to see how this outcome enhances US security.
There are many other reasons to oppose polygraph testing, including its unreliability, and its questionable history and effectiveness. You will hear statements from other speakers on these matters, so I will not address them. I would like to use the few remaining minutes of my time to identify the specific sections of the proposed rule to which I object, and why.
Sections 709.3 and 709.12 specify that the proposed examination consists of much more than the polygraph machine test. The wording in these sections leaves the examiner with too much latitude in an open-ended pre-test interrogation, in deciding how the test questions are to be worded and presented, and in making a judgment concerning deception on the basis of the pre-test interrogation as well as the machine test results. What provisions are there to guard against abusive and intimidating practices by the examiner? How are we to be protected against biases? Are we simply to trust the judgment of the examiner when he is busy looking for evidence not to trust ours?
In addition, what assurances are there that laboratory management will not inject itself into this process? Section 709.4, which defines to whom the examination will be administered, is drawn so broadly that it does not exclude that lab management will have to supply lists of employees who are to be tested and in which order the testing is to take place. What protections are there that such lists will not be engineered to target employees of, say, Chinese or Russian ancestry, employees who are union or employee rights activists, or employees who management would like to get rid of anyway to cover project cost over-runs?
Further, it is clear from Section 709.15 that if the examination indicates deception, or even if the results are inconclusive, a full-blown investigation is triggered, during which the individual will likely lose the clearance, or access authorization, which amounts to the same thing as losing the job. The same consequences, according to Section 709.14, befall an individual who refuses the test, or who fails to complete any part of it. The fact that coercion is used -- threat of loss of clearance and hence job -- to secure an individual's consent to the test seems to me to be illegal, unnecessary, and can even have a result opposite to that intended. People who will submit to such coercion are more likely to be more vulnerable to foreign intelligence agents than those who resist coercion. Thus, it is the people who refuse this test who are the ones you should keep on the job. Finally, I am not a lawyer, but it seems to me that Section 709.22, which bars an individual from having legal counsel present during an interrogation that could lead to loss of livelihood, would not withstand a court challenge.
In summary, I would like to commend Secretary Richardson for all he has done to turn back the many attempts by some members of Congress to impose even more draconian measures on the labs in their misguided attempts to protect nuclear weapons security, and I would urge him to turn this one back, too. Or, at the very least, completely re-write this Rule so that polygraph testing would be used only to support an investigation, instead of as a precursor to one. This proposed rule has things the wrong way about, and can only lead to endless court challenges, wide-scale resistance, and ultimately a degradation of the science on which our nuclear deterrent depends.
Ladies and Gentlemen,
Thank you for this opportunity to comment on the issue of polygraphs and our national security.
I will address only one out of the many problems with polygraphs: the impact on recruiting and retaining competent staff.
The first point to make is that for recruiting and retaining staff, it is neither my opinion nor your opinion of polygraphs that matters. It is the opinion of our staff. This is a free country and people can freely choose their place of employment.
I lead the computational physics group in A-Program--about 100 physicists, computer scientists and systems operations engineers. We develop complex computer programs used to simulate nuclear weapons. The stockpile stewardship program seeks to maintain the stockpile without experimental testing--no nuclear explosions in Nevada or elsewhere. Our computer simulations have to be good enough to replace real experiments. This enormous challenge requires an unprecedented improvement in our simulations. If we fail, the US will be forced to return to real, rather than simulated, testing. My group is responsible for about one-half of the LLNL development of these simulations. This work is at the forefront of computational physics and computational science. We have to recruit and retain our staff in a very competitive job market. All of you know about Silicon Valley. It is 45 miles southwest of Livermore. The computer companies there aggressively recruit good computational staff. Even closer to us is PeopleSoft, 6 miles West of here in Pleasanton. You passed them on 580 as you neared Livermore. They had 3000 openings last year.
There are a number of incentives to work here, including:
There are also a number of disincentives, including:
To these disincentives, we now plan to add polygraphs.
These disincentives make recruiting very difficult. The recruiting, clearance and training process now takes one and a half to two years. I spend much of my time recruiting to add staff and to replace those who leave to join the computer community in the Bay Area. Four of my best staff left my group during the last two months due to security issues. After waiting for 13 months for a clearance, Ian accepted a job with NETSCAPE a week before his clearance came through. Another left because of his unease with the whole security atmosphere, including the two stand-downs ordered by DOE with no notice or planning. Brian told us: "life is too short and that there are much better places to work where some bureaucrat won't shut me down for no good reason that I can see and there aren't guards with guns and I won't get punished if I make a minor mistake." You may or may not agree with Brian, but it doesn't matter. It's a free country. Brian has chosen not to work here anymore, and we are busy trying find someone half as good as he was. I have two job offers out to prospective staff. Both prospects have expressed a lot of concern about polygraphs.
I predict that polygraphs will further erode our ability to recruit and retain quality staff. I have seen no convincing evidence that polygraphs are an effective screening tool. I question the wisdom of relying upon polygraphs for screening for something as important as national security. On the basis of a recent polygraph interrogation I took for the NSA, I think that some of the fears people have are probably exaggerated. However, my views and your views on polygraphs are, with all due respect, irrelevant for recruiting and retaining staff. The relevant views are those of the staff, and they are scared of polygraphs due to the reputation and abuse of polygraphs by law enforcement and intelligence agencies. Our best staff, especially computer scientists and systems operations engineers, have too many other choices for challenging positions with higher pay--often with stock options, almost none of our security restrictions, more opportunity for job mobility and public recognition of their work, and no polygraphs. I think that the degradation of national security that will follow if we cannot get good people to ensure that the stockpile will work far outweighs the possible increased security that some claim that polygraphs can bring. Is the political cover and possible improved security that polygraphs give the DOE worth the real degradation to national security that will result from the exodus of good staff? I think not. I appeal to you to not damage the national security of the US with polygraphs.
WILLIAM O'CONNELL
[Webmaster's Note: Bill's oral comments were condensed from this version that was submitted to the panel .]
Comments submitted to DOE on September 14, 1999 by William O'Connell, President of the Society of Professional Scientists and Engineers, P.O. Box 1066, Livermore, California 94551. (925) 449-4846 http://www.spse.org
Mr. Hinckley and distinguished panel, thank you for the opportunity to present my comments on proposed polygraph regulations through the Federal Register notice and comment procedure. I am William O'Connell, President for 1999 of the Society of Professional Scientists and Engineers (SPSE). The SPSE is an independent organization of professional employees at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. The SPSE is a labor organization under California law, and is concerned with employee rights in the workplace. The SPSE has asked me to present these comments, which are guided by the SPSE members, but in the final wording is my responsibility. My comments are indirectly meant also for the U.S. Congress, which is considering a new law concerning polygraph testing, but has not passed a final bill yet.
1. Unreliability.
The polygraph process, and especially the polygraph as a screening tool for a very minuscule fraction of hypothesized spies, is an unreliable process. There are the problems of false negatives, which mean that the process does not really reinforce our nation's security. There are also problems of false positives, which put the reputations and careers of loyal government employees into jeopardy. I won't launch into the continuing scientific debate during this hearing, but I will just quote a summation by the U.S Supreme Court. In a 1998 decision (United States vs. Scheffer) the Supreme Court agreed that a military court was reasonable in continuing to follow Military Rule of Evidence 707, which provides, "(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the results of a polygraph examination, the opinion of a polygraph examiner, or any reference to an offer to take, failure to take, or taking of a polygraph examination, shall not be admitted into evidence."
The Supreme Court's majority opinion notes, "Rule 707 serves several legitimate interests in the criminal trial process. These interests include ensuring that only reliable evidence is introduced at trial, preserving the jury's role in determining credibility, and avoiding litigation that is collateral to the primary purpose of the trial."
On the first interest, only reliable evidence, the majority opinion notes, "... there is simply no consensus that polygraph evidence is reliable. To this day, the scientific community remains extremely polarized about the reliability of polygraph techniques." -- and goes on to cite references.
The application of a polygraph procedure in looking for a very small fraction of true positives is also doubtful. There is a tendency to keep the fraction of indicated positive results small. This may be why the later unveiled CIA spy Aldrich Ames could pass his CIA polygraph tests.
2. Undue burden on loyal employees.
The counter-intelligence scope polygraph procedure places a serious burden on those employees subject to the test. A false positive finding, or a finding of lack of complete cooperation in the test, could result in further complications, interruption or loss of career, and loss of reputation. A briefing by DOE for laboratory employees last Friday, available now on videotape from the Laboratory's Public Affairs Office and Library, elaborated on the test procedure as described briefly in the proposed regulations. The subject is in the test alone; no independent witness is allowed in the room. The polygraph examiner, to be certified, must be an experienced counterintelligence or criminal investigator with extensive additional training in interrogation and in psychology [see proposed 10 CFR 709.31 (b) (1)]. The examiner is backed up by a supervisor watching through closed-circuit television. A pre-test interview with the examiner clarifies the procedure and the questions, and elicits any "gray areas" which the subject feels might interact with his feelings when asked the main questions. If upon completion of the polygraph test there are any unresolved issues, the polygraph examiner must conduct an in-depth interview of the individual to address those unresolved issues [see proposed 10 CFR 709.15 (a)]. In the briefing for employees last Friday, Gordon Barland of the DOD Polygraph Institute stated that in a one-year series of counter-intelligence scope polygraph exams in DOD with some 7500 subjects, about 120 or 1.5% confessed to something which was detected to be troubling themówhether it be minor misdeeds, breaking of company rules, or breaking of laws. Thus I have to admit that the polygraph procedure is a neat tool of some power for an interrogator, even if it is not of a known level of reliability in the end.
Thus in summary, the screening polygraph examination places a serious burden on employees, and violates what are usually considered an American citizen's civil rights. There is not sufficient justification for putting thousands of loyal employees of the government through this process just to highlight one or two who might be equally well brought to notice by good field investigation or other specific evidence.
I can tell you from my own recent conversations that many Lawrence Livermore Lab employees are troubled by the proposed polygraph rule, in particular by the chances of false positives, by the violation of citizens' rights and dignity, and by the interrogation emphasis; and all for a result which is only modestly effective in directing further attention to real positives. I am appending to my written comment a recent formal statement by SPSE on the subject.
3. A focus on the areas of the real security problems would be more effective.
The recent Congressional committees and the President's PFIAB committee report have found security deficiencies in DOE, mainly in the areas of management follow-up, physical security, and procedural security. DOE has made improvements in some of these areas, but much more could be done. Further efforts should focus on the real problem areas. I am afraid that the DOE efforts on polygraph procedures and polygraph application will detract attention from areas that could better contribute to our nation's security.
4. Congressional action is under deliberation, not yet completed.
The U.S. Congress is presently considering a new law, as part of a Defense bill, which would require some polygraph testing of DOE and Contractor employees. A final bill has not passed yet.
The DOE should extend its comment period indefinitely until forty-five days after Congress has completed its deliberations and any bill has been signed into law.
5. The scope of employees affected by the DOE proposed rule goes beyond what Congress is considering.
The Congressional bill language has gone through several versions. The latest one, from the House-Senate Conference on the Defense bill, calls for polygraph testing for a restricted scope of DOE programs -- counter-intelligence and a few other types of programs, and programs which the Secretary of Energy designates as requiring special access restrictions.
The proposed DOE rules cover a similar list of programs, including special access programs, but go on to list one broader and rather vague category, in proposed 10 CFR 709.4 (a) (6): "Positions that DOE has determined have a need-to-know or access to information specifically designated by the Secretary of his delegatee regarding the design and operation of nuclear weapons and associated use and control features."
This category could include all personnel having a Q clearance and actively using that clearance, because after all that is what the Q clearance is for.
This proposed section should be simply deleted, since the proposed rules already designate special access programs in proposed 10 CFR 709.4 (a) (3).
6. Further comments.
I will be submitting further written comments during the comment period to expand on the points noted briefly here. If polygraph tests must be used, then a subject should be able to use his own chosen examiner, and have a witness or counsel present. Further, the scope should be strictly limited to the principal questions, and the allowed scope of these questions, given in proposed 10 CFR 709.11 (b), should be written more tightly. For example, "unauthorized foreign contacts" should be expanded to read "unauthorized foreign contacts for the purposes of conducting espionage, sabotage, or terrorism." Diagnostic or control questions should be more strictly limited in scope. "Fishing" questions such as "Why are you nervous when asked this question" should be restricted.
Thank you for the opportunity to comment and hopefully, by the rationale of the comments, to influence the final form of the rules being developed in this proposed rulemaking process.
DAVID DEARBORN
Statement by David Dearborn made at the Public Hearing Discussing the Proposal for Polygraph Screening held at LLNL 14 Sept. 1999.
My name is David Dearborn, and I am a physicist at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). In my years here, I have studied basic physical processes pertinent to weapons, proposed and fielded experiments for detecting clandestine nuclear test, and designed an innovative new nuclear explosive tested in several underground events. I have been heavily involved with the W87 Life Extension Program, W78 peer review, and have participated in a number of other stockpile support activities. I have received two Weapons Recognition of Excellence Award from the Department of Energy (DOE), one for work on Lasers, and another for developing a new powerful method for analyzing radar data of reentry vehicles. In addition, I regularly publish in astrophysics, and archaeology, and received the 1998 Shelby Fellow of the Australian Academy of Science.
Earlier this year, the media informed us that the Secretary had ordered a stand- down to refresh our security awareness. As part of that re-education experience, an ex-FBI officer and security consultant gave a most entertaining lecture that included anecdotes regarding two spies,. Neither of these traitors had been identified through the regular polygraphic screenings of their agencies. The inefficacy of polygraph screening should not surprise anyone, as it violates a basic rule for the competent use of this tool. According to the American Association of Police Polygraphists (AAPP), "The effectiveness of the polygraph examination, to a large extent, will be based upon the thoroughness of the investigation, prior to having the person take the examination." Genuinely concerned with the detection of criminal behavior and security risks, the value of polygraphic screening was strongly questioned in a 1983 study by the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA-TM-H-15). They found little basis to believe that such a subjective process added little assurance, particularly when the subjects were coerced to volunteer. Lest anyone claim that procedures have improved, in his 1997 testimony before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Dr. Drew C. Richardson of the FBI Laboratory went much further, stating that polygraph screening "is completely without any theoretical foundation and has absolutely no validity." He further says, "the diagnostic value of this type of testing is no more than that of astrology or tea-leaf reading (September 29 1997 - available at: <http://www.nopolygraph.com/drewtest.htm>).
Of course the subjectivity of polygraphic examination is a win/win for the DOE. An agency that wants its people to pass will find most of them doing so. Perhaps this is the origin of the unbelievable accuracy claims of fifth of one percent (a rate not supported by the body of peer reviewed academic research for polygraph usage nor in the OTA study). Accepting these claims reduces cost of deflecting political criticism from the Secretary to the reputations and careers of "only" 15 innocent men and women in an organization the size of LLNL. As an additional benefit, the next time a laboratory employee exercises his freedom of speech along a line not appreciated by the DOE, it will not be necessary to work through an unresponsive UC management that believes in constitutional rights. The individual can simply be examined a little more closely than others. If this is not part of DOE's agenda, why does their proposed interrogation process not allow the presence of a polygraphic expert representing the employee? If there is nothing to hide, why will the DOE not accept professional monitoring to guarantee that all tests are administered equally, and that some tests will not be more equal? An agency that makes such an Orwellian use of the word "volunteer", must expect this type of question.
Here at LLNL we take security seriously. My colleagues and I produce the secrets that you come here claiming to protect. We worked hard to wrestle them from nature, and we recognize their value. We further recognize ourselves to hold positions of trust, and we have already allowed extensive intrusion into our lives, by making available our financial, legal, and health records, as well as by answering in-depth questions on friends relations and much more. Yet, here you come, threatening our honor and integrity and requiring us (on effective threat to our employment) to "volunteer" for an even deeper intrusion into our constitutional right to privacy by using a flawed procedure that effectively gives the DOE a free hand to terminate any employee who speaks his or her conscience. If you choose to implement this astrology surrogate, and to treat us with such deep disrespect, do not confuse our contempt for arrogance.
WILL TONG
[Webmaster's Note: Mr. Tong's comments to the panel were extemporaneous. He later wrote an article published in the San Francisco Chronicle's Open Forum.]
http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/chronicle/archive/1999/09/22/ED35119.DTL
STEVE PATENAUDE
Members of the Panel, Gentlemen
My name is Steve Patenaude. I am an employee of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory entering my 37th year as a scientist. I am here representing myself.
I am here today to add my voice to the growing throng of those opposing the proposed use of polygraph testing as an "improvement" in security. After extensive reading, I have concluded the polygraph testing has highly questionable value as a scientific 'tool', offering little counterintelligence improvement to security while exposing enormous risk for those forced to take a polygraph test. After all, the scientific method is the mission of this Laboratory. My main concern is that a subjective test like a polygraph could be used by an unscrupulous individual(s) to selectively silence unpopular voices of dissent, ... a well established condition of which the Dept. of Energy and the State Dept. has past knowledge.
As teenager, I could not understand why the adults of this era were so upset over the word of some obscure senator crackling out the radio saying;
"Mr. Smith...Are you now or have you ever been a member of the communist party?"
I would, not too much later, come to loathe those words. And now gentlemen here we are again facing the 1950's 'loyalty oath question' wrapped in a security shell as polygraph testing.
I love my country!
For nearly four decades I have been intimate with the naked beauty, the terror, and the enormous destructive potential of nuclear weapons. I am here to tell you in the STRONGEST possible terms; I can not imagine any circumstance in which I would betray these secrets to anyone, much less a foreign power. This fact is something that you must trust me on, however this polygraph testing proposal is contrary to that trust. Without trust, ... this "nuclear game" is over.
I would like to read a few sentences taken from the Jan 21, 1999 Congressional Record given on the floor of the United States Senate by the former Ark. Senator Dale Bumper.
"H. L. Mencken one time said, 'When you hear someone say, "This is not about money, it's about money."'"
"and when you hear someone say [speaking of the impeachment charges], 'This is not about sex, it's about sex.'"
(End quote from Congressional Record)
And so when you hear someone say of polygraph testing, "This is not about politics, it's about politics!!!"
I have willing devoted most of my adult life to the furtherance of science at this Laboratory. I find being here today, to be in one "incredulous". I could not imagine a more corrosive force to this laboratory, than distrust. I can only speculate the espionage would do less damage to the national security than institutional distrust of the very people now charged with its protection of the national secrets.
I fear for the continuance of the University of California management of this great institution.
Time and circumstance may prevent me having to make the difficult decision; "will I submit to a polygraph test?"
When and/or if that time comes, there can be little doubt as to the course I must choose.
THOMAS THOMSON
Statement of Thomas Thomson Sept 14, 1999
I am Thomas Thomson, for over 30 years a weapon designer at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.
First let us be clear as to what is the real issue today. It is not about espionage nor about polygraph machines nor about nuclear secrets. It is about political control. It is about suppressing dissenting views. It is shocking that after a lapse of 200 years this administration is attempting to resurrect the evils of the Sedition Act of 1798, an act notorious for its blatant political motivation.
The Sedition Act of 1798 intended to re-enact the English common law of seditious libel. This law "... permitted very broad prosecution for 'seditious libel' subsequent to the publication of anything unfriendly to the government. The truth of the published matter at issue did not constitute a defense, and the judge had sole power to decide whether or not it was libelous." [Pg. 197, The American Constitution, A. H. Kelly & W. A. Harbison 3rdEd, W.W. Norton N.Y.]
"The Sedition Act, like the Alien Acts, accomplished more by the threat it made than by any actual enforcement. A large number of indictments were returned, but only a few persons, most of them prominent Republican editors, were brought to trial. When the trials were held, however, the methods of the prosecution were as ruthless as the law under which the charge was made, ..." [pg. 231, The Federal Union, J.D. Hicks, 2nd Ed, Houghton Mifflin, Cambridge MA]
The polygraph screenings now proposed will serve the same purpose. Rather than having to publish "unfriendly" articles, the crime will be to have "unfriendly" squiggles on a chart. And the interrogators will be the sole judges as to whether or not this constitutes "sedition". Likewise innocence will be no defense -- the crime is failure to pass the test -- the truth or falsity of the questions is not important. Just as in the Sedition Act more will be accomplished by the threat than actual enforcement.
On this issue I stand strongly with the President -- Jefferson not Clinton.
What is it that this administration hopes to accomplish with this new Sedition Act? They hope to accomplish precisely what the framers of the original act hoped to accomplish -- the silencing of dissent. This should come as no surprise. When this administration first came to power their first Energy secretary stated that her first priority would be accountability. I hope no one was so foolish as to think she was talking about numbers or ledger books. This was a politician speaking, and when a politician speaks of accountability they mean political accountability --you will answer for any dissenting views.
So the question is not about the veracity of polygraph screening tests they are well known to be useless for the stated purposes the question is what dissenting views are they now afraid of. Faced with evidence of gross mismanagement Congress has recently see fit to order the restructuring of the Energy department. And to date Congress has only scratched the surface. To get to the truth you must parse every statement and diagram every sentence until you are certain that you understand what the meaning of is is. Read every statement as if it was meant to mislead and you will reap a rich harvest. Pay attention only to statements under oath and official documents all the others are just "spin" and are not meant to clarify or find the truth.
It is a truism that institutions only worry about heresy when they have begun to rot from within. And just what rot is this administration trying to hide from the Congress and the American people?
Biographic Note:
Thomas Thomson began work as a physicist at the then Lawrence
Radiation Laboratory in 1965 and since that time has been a nuclear
warhead designer for the Improved Spartan ABM system, the HardSite
ABM system, the W79 8" Artillery Fired Atomic Projectile,
special nuclear devices for underground nuclear weapons effects
testing, and special purpose nuclear warheads. He led the physics
group at Lawrence Livermore originally assigned to assess the
utility of high-energy lasers to nuclear weapon design issues.
He has also served as a project leader for the W70 Lance tactical
missile warhead and as a project leader for the W62 Minuteman
III warhead. He has participated in the design and execution of
24 nuclear underground tests. In 1985 he received a DOE award
for innovation in nuclear design. He currently serves as Deputy
Thermonuclear Program Leader for Plans.
NORMAN THOMAS
[Webmaster's note: Norman Thomas was unable to attend the hearing. Manuel Garcia read Mr. Thomas' statement to the panel.]
In the spring of 1961, when I was a physics student at a California university studying for the Graduate Record Exam, the chairman of the physics department asked me to help at an American Association of Physics Teachers meeting by running a 16-mm movie projector. When I arrived at the physics lecture hall the next Saturday morning, I found the projector already set up. I threaded the film through it and proceeded to show the instructional physics movie. After the meeting, I re-wound the film, returned it to the chairman, left the projector where I had found it, and returned to my apartment.
After my first physics class the following Monday, I was called in to the physics department office and asked, "Where did you put the movie projector?" I said, "I left it in the lecture hall." It turned out that the projector could not be found--and so my life for the next two weeks encompassed a series of traumatic encounters with the campus and local police departments.
On Tuesday, the campus police interrogated me under a bright light in a closed room. They asked, "Why did you take the projector? Where is the projector?" they asked. My pleas of innocence were ignored. On Wednesday, I was asked to take a lie detector test, which was to be administered at the school's Department of Criminology by the local law enforcement agency. They told me that they could not force me to take the test. But, since I had nothing to hide, I agreed to take it. To my shocked surprise, the polygraph test results were positive; according to the machine, I was a thief, a felon!
Now the police investigators knew that they had their perpetrator. In the days that followed, I felt that I was under surveillance. The local police asked if they could visit my apartment. I agreed again, knowing that since I was innocent nothing in my apartment could incriminate me. They immediately followed me to my apartment, apparently so that I couldn't dispose of any evidence of "my crime." They searched every room, cupboard, and closet in my apartment. Upon opening one closet, they discovered my (legally owned) revolver on the top shelf. They took it to a table, examined it thoroughly, and recorded the serial number. Even though they did not find the missing projector, this discovery had apparently confirmed their idea that I was a criminal--now possibly in the possession of other stolen property.
My orderly world was collapsing around me into chaos at a critical point of my professional career: just before my Graduate Record Exam. I was traumatized! Finally, after two weeks, on a Monday morning, the department secretary called me to say, "We found the movie projector locked in the chairman's office this morning"! They now knew that no crime had been committed!
However, I never received either a letter or even a phone call from the campus police or local law enforcement agency telling me that my polygraph test had resulted in a false positive "indication." Nor was any semblance of an apology ever made for any inconvenience, problems, or terror this "false indication" caused me. Nor was I ever informed that a percentage of polygraph tests will always result in false positives.
But, I was most certainly personally informed about what an innocent person giving a false positive during a "voluntary" polygraph test mentally goes through, and it is an experience I would wish upon no one else.
This incident, at the beginning of my professional career, taught me never to trust the results "elicited" by polygraph machines and their operators. Today, almost 40 years later at the climax of my professional career, we face an institutionalizing of polygraph testing at LLNL. From my first-hand knowledge of what can happen when such tests fail, I urge DOE, the University of California and Lab management to reject the policy of polygraph testing "certain" lab personnel, or of testing new hires as a condition of employment for certain jobs.
Norman Thomas
September 8, 1999
UC-LLNL
Chemistry and Materials Science
Livermore, CA
MANUEL GARCIA
_____________________________________________________________
Abstract
The value of LLNL will diminish with polygraphy. In your haste to regain your dignity, don't lose your honor. I believe that SPSE has stated the best course of action, which is to "open a dialogue with laboratory workers themselves as to how security (can) be improved." Intimidating us further with polygraphy is neither an honorable nor effective substitute for security measures.
Outline
1) Polygraphy does not address the basic security issues:
a) physical security of documents,
-> "bookstore alarms,"
b) physical security of computer networks,
-> separate office buildings for classified and unclassified systems, no cross-talk,
c) travel disclosures,
-> interview travelers on "high-risk" trips,
d) reduce the amount and distribution of classified rather than increasing the number of people at security jeopardy.
2) Polygraphy is pseudo-science and will cheapen the image of DOE science labs,
-> a deterrent to intelligent prospects
-> a deterrent to people of principle.
3) Polygraphy is a degradation of employee and citizen rights,
-> one-way trust, we must trust DOE, it does not trust us,
i) interrogation without representation is fascism,
-> DOE lacks credibility as a trustworthy agency:
i) lack of response to employee concerns about equity, management accountability, and safety,
ii) lack of response in aiding employees suffering reprisals (e.g., the Lappa case at LLNL).
Speech
DOE does not deserve this power. It has failed to listen to employee concerns on equity, mismanagement, safety, and retaliation - witness the Lappa case now pending - and there is no reason to believe that it will not abuse this power. Sloppy management, excessive distribution of classified material, racially tinged and inept security investigations, and a disdain of employee involvement in policy questions do not add up to a just cause for further intimidation of the productive workforce with a personally invasive, pseudo-scientific inquisition. "Above all else, do no harm," to paraphrase Hippocrates. I do not relish having my body invaded to have my mind raped by a class of latter-day phrenologists and soothsayers. Do your homework instead, follow through on gumshoe investigations, diminish the number of classified documents and networks, and secure them with physical barriers, interview travelers as needed, these are the measures that unmask espionage. You are more likely to lose talented people of principle, and trample on the rights of unlucky honest citizens - people whom you should prize - than to nab spies or see this intimidated workforce generate anything worth spying on. The rush to polygraphy is symptomatic of a lack of vision or faith in democratic principles, and it is this attitude on your part, more than anything else, that has precipitated the crisis of confidence you now face. Safeguarding our most personal rights is the fundamental point of national security, if you are willing to sacrifice that then you eliminate any moral justification for your agency and its actions.
"The great wish of some is to avenge themselves on some particular enemy, the great wish of others to save their own pocket. Slow in assembling, they devote a very small fraction of the time to the consideration of any public object, most of it to the prosecution of their own objects. Meanwhile each fancies that no harm will come of his neglect, that it is the business of somebody else to look after this or that for him; and so, by the same notion being entertained by all separately, the common cause imperceptibly decays."
- Thucydides, c. 460-400 B.C.
MARK MALLAH
Thank you. My name is Mark Mallah.
I'm representing myself. And unlike the previous speakers, I am not employed here.
I was special agent of the FBI from 1987 to 1996. And for the majority of that time, I worked in Foreign Counterintelligence, so I am a very strong believer in good internal security.
And I'm here today to say that the polygraph has been tried, has been in use, and has been a total failure.
I feel particularly strong about this because in 1995, I took a routine counterintelligence scale polygraph, exactly like the ones contemplated here today. And solely because of that polygraph, I was falsely accused of unauthorized contacts with foreign intelligence service.
These polygraph charts and nothing more launched a major investigation of me which lasted about two years or almost two years.
This included 24-hour surveillance, including an airplane buzzing above my house every morning; my home was searched, which I consented to in an effort to demonstrate my innocence; the FBI conducted extensive interviews of my family members, my wife, and many, many friends, some of whom I hadn't seen in 10 and 12 years.
These interviews were highly insinuating, and there were far, far too many details for me to elaborate upon here.
It took me nearly two years -- it took two years to finally clear my name. And throughout those two years, the words of one of the foremost proponents of the polygraph kept ringing in my ears.
In 1986, he wrote -- and this is David Raskin -- he wrote,
"A more extreme problem of the same type is inherent in large-scale counterintelligence polygraph screening programs. Even if one accepts a liberal estimate that one percent of the tested individuals are actually spies, 89 to 96 percent of those found deceptive on the polygraph test would be wrongly suspected."
The government would have to spend millions of dollars for field investigations to uncover the mistakes, or, as I like to say, to cover the mistakes.
I would respectfully suggest to you that before investing so much in the polygraph, you demand and insist upon empirical proof of its success.
And before I walked in here today, I was not aware of one single case where a spy has ever been caught by the polygraph. And Dr. Barland mentioned a couple cases to the contrary, and I would urge you to pay very close attention to that because in my experience, polygraph examiners inflate their own figures, mischaracterize what is an admission, all for the purpose of serving their own industry.
Now, I'm not saying they're lying. But I am saying that they have a strong incentive to shade all the evidence in their favor.
And also be aware that to a polygraph examiner/interrogator, a confession is like a trophy. So the slightest sliver of anything -- anything that can be construed or misconstrued as damaging -- that examiner has a strong incentive to say, "I got an admission; this person was deceptive; here's the proof."
If I were the head of a hostile intelligence service, right about now I'd be throwing a party at the prospect of the Department of Energy employing large-scale polygraphs because I would know that with some training, the polygraph is very easy to beat.
So my spy, I'd put right here. And he would pass the polygraph because all the tests indicate such, and you would have a false sense of security about that. You would think that guy is completely clean.
I would also note that you would be completely diverted in pursuing the wrong people. So you would be completely wasting your energy. All the while the polygraph experts are insisting that those people are deceptive.
And to top it off, the polygraph has zero accountability. If the examiner says someone is deceptive, you launch an investigation and you can't find anything, the polygraph people will tell you, "You just haven't found it; you've got to keep looking."
They're not going to admit that they're wrong, nor would they have any reason to think they're wrong. They don't even know that they're wrong if they are wrong.
And for those people falsely accused, those 89 to 96 percent, according to Dr. Raskin, there is no way for them to prove a negative.
If we had a device that could deliver on the advertised promises of polygraph, I would be all for it. But unfortunately, in 1999 we do not have that luxury.
If you're truly interested in catching spies, I suggest you go back and look on the record of how every spy in this country has ever been caught. Now, I haven't studied it myself, but to my knowledge, it's been a combination of defectors, sources and family members and other investigative channels. My suggestion would be to study the successful techniques and build on those.
Now, I'm not saying we have to settle for that and we have to freeze ourselves in the past. What I am saying is that using a polygraph machine to help detect national security is nothing more than a delusion which inevitably will result in the same mistakes that were made in my own case and ultimately threaten national security far more than it will protect it.
Thank you.
JANE DIGNON
My name is Jane Dignon. I have worked as a physicist at the lab for nearly 10 years, and I am representing myself.
First I would like to say that I support the statement of the SPSE presented earlier by my colleague Bill O'Connell.
For my testimony I would like to read 2 passages from a book entitled A TREMOR IN THE BLOOD* written by David T. Lykken.
Dr. David Lykken is a Professor of Psychology at the University of Minnesota (retired), is a Fellow of the American Association for the Advancement of Science and of the American Psychological Association. He has testified on lie detector evidence in many state, federal and military courts, a committee of British Parliament, legislative committees of several states, as well as three committees of the House and Senate. In 1990, he received the American Psychological Association's Award for Distinguished Contribution to Psychology in the Public Interest.
The first passage is as follows:
"the theory and methods of polygraphic lie detection are
not rocket
science, indeed, they are not science at all. Most of these techniques
were developed by police or by lawyers"
the second:
"we have no definitive scientific evidence on which to base
precise
estimates of lie detector's validity. But we have enough evidence
to
say that an innocent person has nearly a 50/50 chance of failing
a lie
detector test"
Even DOE's own expert, Dr. Barland, cannot give convincing estimates
of the reliability of this test. I do not want my innocence, my
career, my family, including my 5 year old daughter's, livelihood
dependent upon an examination that has a 1 in 10 chance of giving
false positive and indeed, as stated above, some experts give
it even worse odds.
The scientists here who develop the national secrets understand very well the need to protect them. This policy is nothing more than intimidation in its highest form.
--------------------
*Lykken, David, T., A TREMOR IN THE BLOOD, Plennum (1998). ISBN
0-306-45782-2
LEE BUSBY
Good morning. My name is Lee Busby, and I represent myself. I am quite unhappy to be here, but I do appreciate this opportunity to address those of you on this panel.
I have been a computer scientist at LLNL since 1987 and was employed at UC Berkeley for about three years prior to that. I am strongly opposed to the imposition of polygraph testing at Livermore and the other national laboratories. The potential for unfair destruction or foreshortening of innocent persons' careers should be considered an unacceptable risk. I believe polygraph testing will instill an atmosphere of intimidation and mistrust that would poison relationships inside the laboratories and cause irreparable harm to these institutions. The scope, quality and value of scientific research will all be detrimentally affected.
Human beings share a propensity toward cooperation with our captors. We tend to internalize the customs of our social organizations, so that it becomes difficult to "break a rule," even in a context where this is obviously harmless, and even in the absence of external enforcements. Polygraph testing is by its nature a powerful force for rule internalization. I suspect this is well-known and valued among managers. However, good science depends on people who have the ability and willingness to set aside preconceptions, go beyond accepted limits, and yes, even to break the rules.
I am not suggesting that we have to give away secrets to do good science or that good scientist are in any way more likely to become spies. My point is that polygraph testing will encourage, reward, and select for a culture with more boundaries and more internal limitations on "right thinking," and this will be devastating to our scientific mission.
There seems to be little awareness for the changes technology may bring to the field of polygraph testing. Those who favor testing must agree that cheaper and less intrusive testing would be even better. Soon it will be possible to put the machinery of a polygraph into a wristwatch, allowing us to carry out round-the-clock remote monitoring looking for "significant responses." We will have software capable of understanding context and content, good enough "even for espionage," as the current DOE program manager put it. If this seems a little extreme, perhaps we'd only ask employees to wear their polygraph during foreign travel, or while giving a talk at a conference where something might slip out. Surely our secrets are worth such a small inconvenience? I see nothing in these written rules that would forbid this outcome. Where will we draw the line?
It is hard to articulate the nature and depth of my feelings about this proposal. On the most basic level, I feel threatened, intimidated, violated and I feel dishonored. I have always imagined I have two roles here at the Laboratory. My primary goal is to produce good science. I strive to be an ornament to my profession in every activity and every relationship, here and outside the fence. Second, but no less important, is my role to protect those materials and ideas that have been designated national secrets. I am greatly honored by the trust our nation places in me. That honor and the mutual trust it is founded upon is central to my job here. This proposal changes the most fundamental aspects of my job. My loyalty is no longer a matter of personal honor; it is a matter of subtle intimidation and coercion towards a corporate definition of that word.
I believe in the existence of a heart of hearts, and that the most important struggles in a person's life are essentially private. I believe that the loyalties I feel are mine alone, and that their precise contours are not at issue so long as my actions meet the standards of my family, my community, my workplace, and my country.
This proposal for lie detector testing is fatally offensive to the honor I feel for the work I do here. The DOE has taken me into a small room and bared its fangs. I am not surprised to observe their length and sharpness. But I am gravely distressed and irrevocably disappointed and disillusioned.
Lee Busby
14 Sept 99
JOEL WONG
Good Morning! My name is Joel Wong and I have work here at LLNL for approximately 14 years. I am representing and speaking for myself today.
I have two concerns.
My first concern is that Asian Americans and in particular Chinese Americans may become unnecessary targets of counter intelligence and suffer from the subjective interpretation of polygraph testing results.
According to Mr. Paul. D. Moore, the FBI's Chief Chinese Intelligence Analyst from 1978 to 1998, ethnic background is a reliable predictor of an employee's possible covert intelligence activity.
Mr. Moore's theory goes something like this:
Because of the above theory, these over zealous protectors of American security conclude that the FBI has every right (and moral duty) to suspect Chinese Americans working in science and high technology areas.
As Asian Americans we are deeply concerned and are highly insulted by this theory. If the above theory had any merit, we can also easily conclude that Italian Americans are more prone to be gangsters, that Irish Americans are more prone to be terrorists, and that Jewish Americans are more prone to spy for money.
My second concern has to do with Asian cultural traits. More and more Asian Americans are valuing their own cultural traits and we are holding on to them. My concern is that the polygraph test administrators are unaware of their own cultural biases with regard to Asian American cultural traits. This can lead to inaccuracies in interpreting polygraph results.
I thank you for this opportunity to speak on this important matter.
Joel Wong
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
P O Box 808, L-382
Livermore, Ca 94550
STEPHEN WOFFORD
[Webmaster's note: Mr. Wofford's comments to the panel were extemporaneous. He intends to submit these written comments.]
I spoke briefly at the public hearings held at LLNL on 14 September 1999. I would like to take this opportunity to expand on those comments.
My name is Stephen Wofford, I am the Assistant Archivist in the Laboratory Archives at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and the comments that follow reflect my personal views only.
I have been at the Laboratory for sixteen and one half years, all of that time in the archives. While my experience at the Lab is not as lengthy as some, and perhaps not as intimate with respect to the technical programs, it may be somewhat broader since the focus of my job is everything the Lab has been involved in since it began operations.
First of all I would like to say the following. Based on media reports and conversations with other employees at the Lab, it is my personal opinion that the decision to proceed with polygraph testing has already been made and that the public hearings and the solicitation of written comments are simply formalities required by law. I hope I am wrong in this, but even if I am right I would be foolish not to take this opportunity to express my concerns. That being said--
Many of the speakers at the public hearings presented facts and figures with respect to the accuracy and reliability of polygraph testing. Their comments were more eloquent and much more detailed than any comments I am prepared to make, so I won't hit you over the head with any more numbers.
Several of the speakers suggested possible motives regarding DOE's desire to institute polygraph testing and what they, DOE, hoped to gain by doing so. I won't be going down that road either.
The security of classified information is a central point in the controversy that has been developing for the last several months. It has been suggested, usually by congressional and senatorial representatives, that the scientists at the national laboratories don't care about that. That they, the scientists, approach the security and protection of classified matter with a casual, even cavalier attitude. I cannot say that this does not happen. I can, and do, say that in my personal experience it is utterly untrue. The security and protection of classified information has been, and continues to be, of paramount importance to every individual I have dealt with in that arena.
In order to be granted my security clearance, I went through an initial, and extensive, background investigation that has been, and will continue to be, supplemented by periodic reinvestigations. In addition I was asked, and voluntarily agreed, to sign a waiver that significantly reduced, if not completely eliminated, any right to privacy I might have enjoyed under the law. I suspect the same is true for everyone else that holds a similar clearance. There is no aspect of my life, not professional, personal, medical or financial that is immune to examination by government representatives if national security is at issue.
Yet now I am told that this is insufficient. That I am still untrustworthy and that I must submit to the indignity of a polygraph examination. Yes, I know, the polygraph testing is voluntary. But if I refuse the test, my access will be revoked and I will be unable to do my job. It is somewhat insulting. However, my dignity has been dented many times over the years and while it is uncomfortable, it has not yet proved fatal. As to the insult--insults are a lot like medicine, they only work if you take them. So, if I'm told to take the test, I'll take the test. I'm not a spy, I have never been one, and I have no desire or intention to become one.
But I'm not the one you need to worry about. In the grand scheme of things I'm a nobody. You need to worry about the highly talented and skilled scientific and technical staff at the national laboratories. The people who do the science. The people whose efforts have produced the reputations these laboratories enjoy and the security our nation enjoys.
The next obvious question from your end is "Well, if you've nothing to hide, why do you object to taking a polygraph test?" The answer to that is simple; it's human nature.
During my time at the Laboratory I have had occasion to interact with physicists, engineers and chemists, with scientific and technical people at virtually all levels. It is my observation that there are two primary reasons why these highly skilled and talented people choose to work here at the Laboratory. (After all, in the private sector most of them could command higher salaries, stock options, nice offices, the ability to publish the results of their research and other perks not available at the national laboratories.)
The first reason is the very real and natural desire of intelligent and inquiring minds to discover new things. To "push the envelop" of scientific advancement and expand the horizons of human knowledge. To play with the best toys available. That describes the national laboratories. Private sector companies and "for profit" businesses do not typically fund or engage in the kind of research and development carried out by the national laboratories. If they did, there would be no such things as technology transfer programs and CRADA's.
The second, and perhaps most important reason, is patriotism. I realize that the concept of patriotism has suffered in the last few decades. In some circles it has fallen to the level of "politically incorrect." But it is real and it does exist here at the national laboratories.
I'm not talking about the kind of patriotism depicted in Hollywood films. I'm talking about the quiet kind--the kind that allows us to pass through the lines of anti-nuclear demonstrators with some regularity. Demonstrators who carry signs calling us names and accusing us of numerous things ranging from crimes against humanity to being inhuman ourselves. Demonstrators, who, I've noticed, rarely appear outside DOE headquarters or field offices. The kind of patriotism that permits us to deal with estrangement from family members and the loss of people we considered friends because we choose to work here.
Think about it. As DOE employees you sometimes find yourselves in the news when a faux pas is committed at senior levels. If a Lab employee breaks wind in a public place, the next day's banner headlines read "NUC. PLANT WORKER RELEASES TOXIC GAS." Yes, I'm being facetious and yes, I'm exaggerating - but not very much.
The people who make the national laboratories work, the scientific and technical staff, are dedicated, patriotic people. Many of them have devoted their entire adult careers to this work because they believe in our country and they believe that the work they do is a positive contribution to the welfare and defense of our country. To have that dedication and patriotism repaid with distrust is demoralizing to such a degree that it cannot even be measured.
The accuracy and reliability of polygraph testing is not an issue for me. It is irrelevant. I don't care.
The reason(s) that motivated DOE to institute polygraph testing; whether it is a genuine concern for security, a move to placate Congress (who hold our purse strings), an attempt to silence dissenting opinions or simply a mechanism allowing security personnel to obtain information they would otherwise not be able to get, whatever the reason, it is irrelevant to me. I don't care.
What is an issue for me, what is relevant, what I do care about is national security. In the context of the national laboratories, that means the continuing ability of those laboratories to assure the safety and reliability of the U.S. nuclear stockpile.
As a U.S. citizen I do not want a graduate of the Sierra Academy armed with a crescent wrench and a ball peen hammer, doing that job. As a citizen I want the best, the most highly trained, most skilful people available to perform the critical tasks associated with stockpile stewardship. And yes, I'm being facetious again with the remark about Sierra Academy. I know that that job will not be given to some ham handed oaf who's only experience with technology is operating a toaster. I fully understand that the people employed to do that job will be qualified. But will they be the best available or just competent?
It is my very real fear that they will not be the best. That instituting polygraph testing will significantly and adversely affect the ability of the national laboratories to retain and recruit people of the highest caliber. That it will drive the best away.
No one I know, not myself, and probably none of you who will read these comments, enjoys working in an environment where the explicit message is: "You cannot be trusted."
JOHN HOBSON
[Webmaster's Note: Mr. Hobson's comments to the panel were extemporaneous. He has written them down for us here.]
I'm here to express opposition to the proposed lie detector tests. In brief, I support the SPSE statement which has been or will be read into the record. My primary concern is that [the lie detector tests] is inaccurate. One need only point out that such tests are inadmissible in courts of law and therefore cannot be considered an aid to justice or due process
I am also concerned that this proposal is politically motivated. The impetus behind this is a supposed spy at Los Alamos, but the evidence is so skant that no prosecution is likely. Expert scientists such as Edward Teller, if newspaper reports I've read are accurate, doubt whether espionage took place. It is clear elements in Congress want to embarrass the Administration, and DOE has become a pawn in this game. Now you want to continue this game by imposing ineffective and ludicrous testing. To me, this is something out of Nazi Germany or Communist Russia.
As a lifelong trained scientist,
I find lie detectors as rational as tea leaves, ouija boards,
horoscopes, and tarot cards, and, just as I don't read my daily
horoscope, I have no intention of submitting to such a test. If
that ends my 27 year career at the Lab, so be it. And shame on
you for disgracing this fine Laboratory and our great country.
John K. Hobson
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
SCOTT BURKHART
September 14, 1999
Full Text:
My name is Scott Burkhart. I've worked as an Engineer in the Laser
Program for Lawrence Livermore National Lab since 1981.
I am opposed to polygraph testing.
I am here on my own time this afternoon, time which I'll be making up later today. I speak for myself alone, as a private citizen who happens to be employed by the Lab.
I have had an enjoyable career at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory working in defense sciences, inertial confinement fusion, and Extreme Ultraviolet Lithography. In each of the areas, I've had the pleasure of working with many singularly brilliant people who continue to work here despite the sometimes contradictory requirements coming from DOE. These Scientists and Engineers have created tremendous intellectual property for the Country and for the taxpayer's dollar, much of which is protected by secrecy requirements. When I joined the laboratory, it was not a condition of my employment that I submit to polygraph testing. Had the polygraph been required, I would have thought long and hard about the type of future employer I was considering. I have to believe that the same thought and question would be on the mind of many of my colleagues.
Why should I oppose polygraph testing?
If I have nothing to hide, then I have nothing to fear, correct?
Then, if you have nothing to fear,
Polygraph testing is generally not accepted as evidence in criminal matters. It is, ultimately, a violation of our fifth amendment rights to be compelled to submit to polygraph testing.
But, back to the Lab - Polygraph testing will only alienate present employees, and will act to dissuade the best and the brightest from joining the lab in the future. This will be bad for the lab and bad for the employees. But for a small, dubious security value it will result in a significant future devaluation of Livermore Lab's scientific and technical value to the Country.
Thank you.
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual service in time of war or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.
STEVE POLLAINE
My name is Steve Pollaine, and I am representing myself. I'm a LLNL physicist in X-Division, where I design targets for the NIF laser. I want to thank you for the opportunity to speak. Although I agree with the sentiments expressed by previous speakers against polygraph testing, I came to speak not about whether we should be tested, but to provide two suggestions on how it might be implemented.
1) We were told by David Renzelman just now that all tapes with no deception found will be destroyed within a 90 day period. I could not find this provision in the Federal Register. Unless I missed seeing it, I suggest that this provision of destruction within 90 days be added to the regulations.
2) I suggest that a panel of our peers be set up, whose members would come from those of us who will be polygraph tested. This panel will issue a report once a quarter that will say, in effect, "yes, the polygraph testing is being conducted fairly." I believe this panel will be helpful because there is a severe morale problem at our lab amongst the designers, and it is even worse at Los Alamos. One contribution to the morale problem at both labs is the fate of our colleague at Los Alamos, who has been fired from his job as an ICF designer. I want to thank you, General Habiger, for responding to my concerns expressed previously about this case. I and all my colleagues I have talked to, both at LLNL and LANL, believe that had this individual committed his two security violations a year ago, he would have received an administrative penalty, but he would not have been fired. In the politically charged atmosphere that now prevails, the prevailing belief among weapons designers is that he is a scapegoat to prove to Congress that the DOE is taking security seriously. Whether this perception is true or not, the fact is that this perception exists, and is contributing to our morale problem. I believe that a panel of our peers that is allowed to review the polygraph policy and follow its implementation on a quarterly basis will contribute to our sense that the process is indeed fair and impartial. Then, should problems arise, we would have more confidence that both national security and our personal interests are being protected.
Thank you again for the opportunity to express my ideas.
JOSEPH NILSEN
September 14, 1999
My name is Joseph Nilsen and I represent myself. I have been a physicist at Livermore for 22 years and spent most of my career in the nuclear weapons program. Thank you for this chance to address the panel concerning the proposed polygraph testing of LLNL employees. I am quite concerned that the polygraph testing will do great harm to our national security. LLNL is a great scientific institute full of many talented scientists, engineers, technicians and other support staff. We are all concerned about protecting the secrets, which we after all created, and which are used for the national defense of our country. We therefore agree to thorough background checks periodically as a condition of doing classified research. However, we did not agree to polygraph tests as a condition of employment.
According to DOE's expert, Mr. Barland, the validity of the polygraph is unknown. Reading the literature it is clear that the polygraph has no scientific basis. Police agencies use the polygraph because it is an effective method of intimidation and interrogation which occasionally results in confessions. These confessions are used as the justification for the polygraph. I do not think you will find many scientists at LLNL, whose career involves questioning every assumption, who will believe its validity. I think Mr. Renzelman, DOE's chief polygrapher, is going to encounter many people who have an attitude problem.
Given the subjective nature of the polygraph test I am very concerned that the careers of many good people could be ruined by these tests. I think a good analogy to the subjective nature of the polygraph is the metal detector. There are many occasions when I travel and successfully go through the metal detector at the airport with keys in my pockets and a pocket full of change. However the sensitivity of the detector can easily be changed. When I visited the Denver Mint officials there said that all their employees go through the metal detector and it is set so sensitive that it can detect the aluminum foil from the wrapper on a piece of gum. General Habiger, I suspect that when you had your polygraph, the machine was set so you would pass. Would you want to be the interrogator who failed the general on the polygraph. I think in your case the interrogator was the one concerned about his job. However, I am sure that when a Chinese American weapons scientists, or a scientist with extensive foreign travel, or someone whose opinions management does not like is subject to the same machine the situation will be reversed and the sensitivity of the machine and the interrogation process will be quite different. Since there is no accountability, the interrogator can do whatever he pleases.
I think the polygraph tests will do great harm to the future vitality of the DOE weapons labs. I can not imagine why bright young people would come to work at Livermore and subject themselves to this degrading experience when they have many other employment options. As Doug Post pointed out, People Soft is nearby and Silicon Valley is not much further away. I do not think we will be hiring the best and the brightest in the future. The older employees may tolerate this insult to their honor because of their vested interest in the UC retirement system but I suspect many older employees will leave when they have the opportunity. I think there is a significant danger that UC will not want to renew the contract with DOE to manage the labs since polygraph tests run counter to normal university policy. I suspect many retired employees who are now lab associates will decide it is not worth the abuse to continue to work at LLNL. I can only imagine the response you will get from consultants in academia when you call them for their polygraph. In the long term the polygraph tests risk turning the DOE laboratories into second rate scientific institutes.
I have many specific concerns but only have time to mention a few. Section 709.4 regarding who is eligible for the polygraph is so vague in item 6 that anyone with a Q clearance is potentially subject to the polygraph. We need clarification as to who is actually subject, how that will be determined, and what access they will be denied if they refuse. The vagueness of this rule certainly opens up endless possibilities for abuse. Will any manager at the laboratory be able to put someone on the polygraph list because of personality conflicts. At a recent conference I attended in Denver several foreign colleagues asked if the US was returning to the McCarthy era?
Section 709.23 concerning the voluntary nature of the polygraph is an insult. If someone does not take the polygraph they will lose access which effectively means they will lose their job. Under LLNL policy anyone who loses their Q clearance can be terminated in 14 days. This polygraph is not voluntary so why pretend it is. Since we are allowed to seek legal advice I think it is essential that the consent form be provided ASAP so that people know what they are being forced to sign under the threat of losing their job, having their career ruined, losing most of their retirement benefits, losing their medical insurance for their family, etc..
These are just of few of my concerns. It is unfortunate that you have already decided the outcome of these hearing as indicated by your admission that you have more than doubled your staff of polygraph operators. Clearly you plan to begin these tests as soon as possible.
In conclusion, I am concerned that we are being denied our constitutional rights in being forced to submit to the polygraph. Without our constitutional rights our society is little different from the totalitarian regimes in other countries.
RENE' STEINHAUER
[Webmaster's Note: Mr. Steinhauer oral testimony varied from this written version. See his email message for more details.]
Good morning/afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. I am Rene' Steinhauer, community organizer for Tri-Valley CAREs, "CARE" being the acronym for "Communities Against a Radioactive Environment." As many of you know, Tri-Valley CAREs functions as a "watchdog" organization concerning Livermore Lab operations and accidents, and frequently finds itself at odds with the Lab. I am here to express concern today regarding the use of polygraph examinations of Lab scientists and support employees, principally for two main reasons.
The first of these is related to what I am sure will be dealt with by other speakers, so I will only mention the topic in passing: The use of polygraph examinations in an overall routine procedure on a scheduled basis is an abuse of power that corrupts and intimidates the American system of Constitutional Rights and jurisprudence. One can envision situations where a particular individual is suspect in a particular crime and, either at the request of prosecutorial or defense teams, a "lie-detector test" is recommended--always, of course, on the claim the intent is to offer the suspect the opportunity to "clear" oneself. But that is a different situation from one in which everyone in a given operation or location is required to submit to such examinations. The ethics and underlying violation of Constitutional rights speaks for itself.
My second objection has to do with my own personal experience. Although I am now the Community Organizer for Tri-Valley CAREs, I was previously employed as an insurance investigator from 1962 through 1972, and thereafter became a California-licensed Private Investigator. Although now nearly retired, I still maintain my license in good standing and remain available for assignments. After more than 37 years, I can say that lie-detector tests do not resolve the issue of truth- or lie-telling. No matter how impressive the accuracy percentages appear, a skilled individual can will to defeat or confound the device, and a more naive individual can give innocent false "positives" to indicate willful lying. In classes and seminars related to such devices in my long career, I have seen examples of both types of lie-detector misreadings. In such sessions, I, myself, have tested the equipment, and have been particularly good at the "confounding" aspect. For obvious reasons relating to not teaching others how to work around the system, I cannot say here how such results are obtained, but I would be glad to volunteer to be tested in order to show that such useless results are possible. Further, when you are dealing with professional spies, it is they who can pass or confound such tests and the innocent, conscientious persons who may fail.
I have given the two principle objections I have in regard to lie detector tests at the Labs. But there is a further, larger issue at hand. Lie Detector Tests are the wrong medicine for what ails the Weapons Labs. The real problem is not a matter of espionage or treason. It is proliferation by any number of innocent--though careless--scientists/technicians. It is well understood by weapons physicists and their critics alike that the term "nuclear secrets" is a bit of an oxymoron. When any of the nuclear-armed states makes a significant advance in its weaponry, the how-to information becomes known to other interested nations with fire years. Edward Teller himself, co-inventor of the hydrogen bomb and co-founder of the Livermore Lab, said as much, himself.
Weapons design data leaks out in numerous small dribbles: in the publication of unclassified papers on nuclear phenomena relevant to weapons advances; in the margins of discussions between scientists at international seminars and conferences where one mistakenly believes the other already knows a piece of the information, and so on. Furthermore, once an interested nation knows that a particular advance in a warhead design is possible, its physicists can postulate pathways and conduct experiments to come up with the same result independent of leaked information.
These non-criminal activities have enormous implications when one considers the nuclear proliferation risks of the U.S. "Stockpile Stewardship" program. The U.S. government has been, and is now, officially sharing our "nuclear secrets" selectively with other countries. Exactly with which countries we share what information shifts over time as our geopolitical goals and alliances change. "Stockpile Stewardship" will exacerbate the situation. Our government has made promises, both formal and whispered, regarding NIF and other "Stewardship" data to a number of countries. Consider the remarks made only last June at the "Deathstar" unveiling regarding France and England's participation in NIF research and Livermore Lab's role in the French Megajoule project. This policy needs to be called by its real name: Nuclear Proliferation. It is this proliferation, sometimes in violation of the ABM, Non-Proliferation, and Comprehensive Test Ban Treaties, and other related treaties--not espionage--that is at the root of the so-called "Chinese spy" issue.
People--especially American patriots--like to talk about the Founding Fathers. One of the them, Ben Franklin, had a saying: "Three may keep a secret, if two of them are dead." In that context, as Teller himself has admitted, there is a time limit to keeping secrets. Thus, the issue before you is not really about lie-detector tests to keep the Lab scientists and employees "honest" and to prosecute or fire them if they fail such doubtful examinations, but rather to recognize the proliferation likelihood of nuclear weaponeering research--which is a policy decision of the DOE, itself! As with the McCarthy hearings, History will judge your own integrity in dealing with this issue.
Thank you.
Rene' Steinhauer
Livermore, California
[Webmaster's Note: Mr. Steinhauer included this email message when he sent us his comments.]
TO: The Society of Professional Scientists and Engineers (SPSE),
Attn: Cheryl M. Remillard, Office Manager
FROM: Rene' G. Steinhauer, Tri-Valley CAREs community organizer.
In connection with your request concerning remarks given before
the DOE panel on Tuesday, 14 September 1999, I herewith attempt
to respond. As I am sure you are aware, pre-prepared remarks for
such events rarely are mouthed as they were written. The way the
polygraph experts started the session by boasting about the reliability
of the equipment and process required me to start with some unwritten
comments in response to their claims, reducing the 5-minute speaking
allowance, and forcing a quicker walk-through of the prepared
remarks shown below.
However, later I was provided an opportunity to visit the podium
a second time, and did complete all of the thoughts contained
in the accompanying text, plus a few additional extemporaneous
remarks not reflected therein. Briefly, there were two such latter
areas: 1) An expansion of my remarks on my professional experience
(I am a California licensed private investigator) that leaves
great doubt in my mind of the polygraph's efficacy and my observations
that police and corporate authorities use the polygraph mainly
as an instrument of intimidation; and that intimidation was the
principle utility seen in the Lab's interests in such technology;
and 2) a "philosophical" observation that a situation
that started out as a suspicion of an act of Chinese (foreign)
espionage has turned into a McCarthyesque search for traitors
among the elite of American scientists, thereafter rhetorically
suggesting that there are other, more dangerous forms of "treason,"
such as elected and appointed public officials who sell and wield
their power against the interests of their constituencies, and
went as far as suggesting that if this "Big Brother"
approach moved forward, it might be in order for lie-detector
tests to be routinely applied to such officials.
I hope the above notes and the following text of "Round 1"
are useful to you. Thank you for your interests in my remarks,
and contact me at Tri-Valley CAREs if I can be of any further
help. --R.G. Steinhauer
ANDREAS TOUPADAKIS
[Webmaster's Note: Mr. Toupadakis has made grammatical changes to his comments as recorded by the DOE.]
Hello. My name is Andreas Toupadakis. I was born in Greece, and I came to the United States twenty years ago. I have not prepared myself. I will say whatever comes to my mouth, from my heart. You will probably think the words that I will speak don't have any connection with what is going on with the issue of polygraphs, but they do.
As some speakers pointed out today, we should not look at what is presented to us without looking at what lies behind that. The importance of everything we hear today in our world is lying behind what we see and hear.
In some way, every one of us has a duty to become a philosopher. If you look back at the ancient wisdom, whether it comes from the ancient Greek philosophers or the Founding Fathers of this nation, you will see that these people had great wisdom. And if you are willing to follow their words and their spirit, it will be much easier to see their wisdom.
We know what they said, we know how they thought, but it's not the way things are going today in this nation--of which I chose to be a citizen. I chose to live here, not once, but twice. What do I mean by that? I came to the USA in 1978. I have lived in eight different states. I know very well what America is all about, and I know why I came to this country. I left six years ago to go and stay permanently in Greece but I still came back because I believe that there are a lot of beautiful things in this country and that is why people come here. But I also see that many that govern this place have nothing to do with the philosophy, the spirit, and the truth of the Founding Fathers that brought this nation to existence. What these people in Washington DC are planning to do has no relationship with the truthful spirit this country was founded on. They are sending you here to tell us what they will have to do, and here we are trying to tell you that we don't want this because it is going to hurt the country, not just the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. It's going to hurt the whole country.
What becomes obvious, as many speakers pointed out, is that the way you are acting is not the right way. Although some of you might laugh when you leave this room, I'm also pretty sure some of you will think about what I will urge you to do next. Now that you have heard both sides, the government on one side and all the speakers today on the other, do you honestly, honestly believe, that your recommended action is the correct action according to wisdom and to the benefit of the United States? And if you see that it is not, I would urge you to resign, to go back to the ones that sent you here and say to them, "Today, I made a decision, I examined all the facts, and I found out that they do not match with what I really believe. This action that we are thinking of taking will damage our nation."
Let some of us make a start like the people of the old days, who were willing to suffer. They were willing to put the truth to the test, and people would follow them, and things would change.
This nation today is the most powerful nation of the earth, but I guarantee you, if it follows the way it is planning, it will not stand for too long. And this is not good, because it was based on democracy, which is by the way a Greek word, and it is diminishing. It is diminishing not only here but everywhere because this current model of governing is being followed almost everywhere.
We have a grave responsibility as American citizens, and I am an American citizen. I forsook the citizenship of my own country years ago to become a citizen of this country, and therefore I feel that I have to speak for the benefit of this country.
Therefore, I ask each one of you that heard these words that were spoken here today, to take a walk alone tonight under the sky and look at the moon and the stars and be honest with himself. Do we want to continue this way in this country?
A change starts with just one man. You do not need two. Who said this? Thoreau said it, an American writer. And he said: "I know this well, that if one thousand, if one hundred, if ten men whom I could name-if ten honest men only-ay, if one HONEST man, in this State of Massachusetts, ceasing to hold slaves, were actually to withdraw from this copartnership, and be locked up in the country jail therefor, it would be the abolition of slavery in America. For it matters not how small the beginning may seem to be: what is once well done is done forever. But we love better to talk about it: that we say is our mission."
So I'm inviting that man from this small audience today to take that step and speak truth like the founders of this country. That is the only way this nation, as powerful as it is, will give the best example for the whole world and will survive -- and then the whole world will survive. Otherwise, if it goes toward the other direction, certainly this country is not going to survive, and neither will the whole world.
This is the greatest responsibility of the United States today, and it is tied to the matter of the polygraph that we're talking about. What I'm speaking about today is not irrelevant to the polygraph. The polygraph is just a tiny case that shows the spirit that is going on in this nation today. And I thank you very much for listening to my words and giving me the time.
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