PREPARED STATEMENT OF DREW C. RICHARDSON
BEFORE THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
ON ITS PROPOSED RULE
"POLYGRAPH EXAMINATION REGULATION"
WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 22, 1999
My name is Dr. Drew Richardson. I'm a Supervisory Special Agent of the FBI and a scientist in the FBI Laboratory. As is the case with others addressing you today, the comments I make and opinions I offer are simply my own and I would like to emphasize that they are not represented as the views of the FBI, its management, or those in its polygraph program. I would begin by heartily congratulating you on holding these hearings and for publicly entertaining diverse opinions, many of which have been contrary to the notion of undertaking the very polygraph screening program that you propose.
I too, however, must express strong reservations about polygraph screening and recommend as strongly as I possibly can that you do not implement such a program. My concerns regarding polygraph screening run the gamut covering the lack of theoretical foundation, a lack of scientific control, a lack of validity as a diagnostic tool, to general concerns about the ethics of common practice to the potential lack of due process and fairness to polygraph examinees as it relates to the use of polygraph results. I believe that the assertions and opinions that I have just offered are in line with vast majority opinion of the relevant scientific community of psychophysiology. Furthermore I believe they parallel the formal and publicly stated positions of the American Medical Association and the American Psychological Association, both of which have gone on record as opposing the use of polygraph examinations for generalized screening purposes.
I have no reason to believe that proponents of a polygraph screening program are necessarily disingenuous nor do I believe that they have intentionally sought to misrepresent their case, but I truly do believe that they are wrong and that there will be serious consequences to individual examinees and to this nation stemming from their folly. I would challenge you to forgo the temptation to use bureaucratic authority alone to foist such a program on your employees. If proponents of polygraph screening are genuine in their belief and affection for such a program, they should welcome the opportunity through open debate and the rigorous cross-examination of opposing ideas to develop the parallel intellectual authority necessary to support their program. No such scientific inquiry has yet occurred. As to whether the scientific underpinnings of polygraph screening are merely pseudo scientific mumbo jumbo, as I would submit, has yet to be shown. But I challenge you to let the debate begin now on your terms or it most certainly will begin at a later time on the adversarial terms of others. I would further suggest that in your inquiry it would be only reasonable and prudent to utilize the vast intellectual force and scientific talent present in the National Laboratory system to affect such an evaluation. I will leave this line of reasoning by suggesting to you that it is not mere circumstance that Nobel Prizes have regularly been awarded to scientists directly or indirectly associated with the National Labs in the disciplines of particle physics, theoretical mathematics and so forth. I would further submit that it is also not merely circumstantial that in the last seventy-five years of polygraph practice that no work of any individual at any time has been remotely deemed worthy of said or comparable accolade.
I am, as others have expressed, concerned about the plight of falsely accused victims stemming from polygraph examinations. I have heard in recent years from a large number of individuals who claim to have been wrongly found deceptive in polygraph examinations. A portion of these individuals has claimed improper treatment and conduct on the part of examining polygraphers. This treatment and conduct ranges from improper language and unprofessional manner to outright civil rights abuse. My expectation is that your proposed program would be characterized by (1) a very low level of sensitivity, making it highly unlikely that a spy will ever be revealed by such methodology, (2) the absence of most of the improper examiner conduct that has been described to me, and (3) an increase in specificity (over and above what polygraph accuracy and base rate considerations would suggest) leading to a reduction in the absolute number of false positives. Although the number of false positive results will be less, because of the serious nature of the relevant subject matter issues, the consequences to any one individual falsely accused will be horrendous. To any who believe that deceptive polygraph results will simply amount to a walk in the park or an academic hiccup for examinees until such time as subsequent investigation either does or does not produce prosecutable facts, I would suggest for your consideration the recently well publicized cases of Mr. Mark Mallah, previously employed as a Special Agent of the FBI, Mr. Adam Ciralsky, presently employed by the CIA, and Mr. David Tenenbaum, who is presently employed by the Department of Defense.
Let me close by assuring you that I share your concern for protecting national security and recognize the immense problems associated with so doing. I strongly suggest to you that real problems unfortunately do not necessarily define viable solutions. Albeit no doubt well intentioned, I believe your efforts with polygraph screening will in no way be found to be a viable solution to your challenges, and, in fact, will only serve to unequivocally disprove the adage about "anything is better than nothing." Thank you very much for your time and attention. I would be glad to address any questions you might have.
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